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ABSTRACT. Foucault’s discussion of parrhēsia – frank speech – in his last two Collège de France 
lecture courses has led many to wonder if Foucault is pursuing parrhēsia as a contemporary strat-
egy for resistance.  This essay argues that ethical parrhēsia on either the Socratic or Cynical model 
would have little critical traction today because the current environment is plagued by problems 
analogous to those Plato thought plagued Athenian democracy. Specifically, authentication of 
parrhesiasts as a technique for authenticating their speech – the specific problem that the move 
to ethical parrhēsia in ancient Greece was designed to solve – becomes intractable in a social me-
dia environment, even with the added Cynical move to pure visibility. The problem is that con-
temporary society overproduces visibility as a condition for participation, which means that the 
context for authenticating parrhesiastic speech is one in which visibility is banalized and in 
which there is a surplus of speech which presents as parrhesiastic. The problem of authentication 
is thus a serious one, one which social media makes particularly intractable. 
Keywords: Foucault, parrhesia, speech, cynicism, biopower, social media, Facebook, visibility, 
authenticity.   
 
The publication of Foucault’s lectures on parrhēsia – roughly, frank speech that puts the 
speaker at considerable risk – invites a general reassessment of his late work.1 In particu-
lar, it shows that Foucault’s interest in techniques of ethical stylization in ancient 
thought was accompanied by an interest in ancient critical practices as well. Current 
public revelations about the role of Facebook and other social media in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election invite consideration of the ways that parrhēsia and other critical 
speech practices might function today, in a context where large numbers of people in-
teract with politics largely through Facebook and other social media platforms. In other 
                                                        
1 “Parrhesiasts are those who undertake to tell the truth at an unspecified price, which may be as high as 
their own death.” Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1982-
83 [1983] (2008), 56 (see also 299-301). 
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words, the intersection of these events enables one to consider them together as a mo-
ment of that reassessment. 
A number of factors complicate this consideration. First, Foucault’s account of Greek 
parrhēsia makes clear that it was not a unitary phenomenon. There were at least three 
versions: a Pre-Socratic, political one, in which parrhēsia is presented as the duty of the 
citizens of democracy; a Socratic, ethical one, in which political parrhēsia fails and be-
comes an ethical practice with political implications; and a third, Cynical version, which 
radicalizes many of the attributes of the Socratic one. The latter two versions are united 
by a concern with the authenticity of the speaker, a concern that is masked in the first 
phase by the limited franchise in Greek democracy. Second, because Foucault discusses 
the transition from ethical to political parrhēsia in the context of Plato’s Socrates, any dis-
cussion of that transition will necessarily encounter contemporary doxa about Plato’s 
critique of democracy and Foucault’s reception of it. Finally, any attempt to import Fou-
cauldian genealogy into a contemporary context should be approached with caution, not 
least because Foucault himself generally resists such moves.2 
In what follows, I argue that ethical parrhēsia on either the Socratic or Cynical model 
would have little critical traction today because the current social media environment is 
plagued by problems analogous to those Plato thought plagued Athenian democracy. 
Specifically, authentication of parrhesiasts as a technique for authenticating their speech 
– the specific problem that the move to ethical parrhēsia was designed to solve – becomes 
intractable in a social media environment, even with the Cynical move to pure visibility. 
I develop the thesis along four primary lines: (1) Foucault invites the consideration of 
ethical parrhēsia in a contemporary context by suggesting that “militant” movements 
exhibit an analogous concern with authenticity. His implicature is nearly always nega-
tive. (2) In Foucault’s analysis, parrhēsia has both a political and an ethical phase; the 
transition between them happens in Plato and is induced by what Plato perceives as 
problems of simulacra. Cynicism is the most radical version of the ethical phase, and 
involves the Cynic’s self-authentication by scandalously living his life completely visi-
bly, subject to continuous inspection. (3) Contemporary society overproduces visibility 
as a condition for participation, which means that the context for authenticating parrhe-
siastic speech is one in which visibility is banalized and in which there is a surplus of 
speech which presents as parrhesiastic. The problem of authentication is thus a serious 
                                                        
2 For the argument that Foucauldian concepts should not be taken from their original contexts, see Colin 
Koopman, "Two Uses of Michel Foucault in Political Theory: Concepts and Methods in Giorgio Agamben 
and Ian Hacking," Constellations 22:4 (2015). For two otherwise very different examples of directly import-
ing parrhēsia into a contemporary context, see Michael Hardt, "The Militancy of Theory," South Atlantic 
Quarterly 110:1 (2011) and Zachary Simpson, "The Truths We Tell Ourselves: Foucault on Parrhesia," 
Foucault Studies 13 (2012). A similar argument (for an example, see Alison Ross, "Why Is "Speaking the 
Truth" Fearless? "Danger" and "Truth" in Foucault's Discussion of Parrhesia," Parrhesia 4 (2008)) is that the 
difference between our society and that of the ancient Greeks means that their practices could be used to 
successfully critique our own.  That of course is possible, but it requires either endorsing the Greek practic-
es or a detailed examination of how those practices might function in a very different context. Nancy 
Luxon, "Truthfulness, Risk, and Trust in the Late Lectures of Michel Foucault," Inquiry 47:5 (2004) usefully 
emphasizes the singular exemplarity of the parrhesiast (as opposed to someone who embodies a more 
general rule or standard), which pushes back against such abstractive tendencies, since the parrhesiast is 
always exemplary relative to a particular context. 
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one. (4) Social media makes the authentication of parrhēsia increasingly difficult. On the 
one hand, parrhesiastic speech can easily be faked. On the other hand, and more funda-
mentally, power in social media works to invisibly shape subjectivity in a direction that 
makes critical speech very difficult. A concluding section suggests that the effort to im-
port parrhēsia into the present remains reliant on a view of subjectivity as exogenous to 
its social context, a view that Foucault consistently attempted to undermine. 
1. Militancy and two strands of parrhēsia 
At the end of Courage of Truth, Foucault connects his discussion of parrhēsia to the devel-
opment of “two major cores of Christian experience,” one mystical, oriented toward 
“confidence in the love of God” and aligned with the parrhesiastic tradition; and the 
other ascetic, emphasizing “fear [of] and obedience” to God.3 The ascetic tradition is fa-
miliar; earlier in the lectures, Foucault had noted that “through the intermediary of 
Christian asceticism and monasticism … the Cynic mode of life was passed on for a very 
long time.”4 But what of the more subaltern version of parrhēsia? Foucault characterizes 
this mystical, positive version as follows: 
In its positive value, parrhēsia appears as a sort of hinge virtue, which characterizes 
both the attitude of the Christian, of the good Christian, towards men, and his way of 
being with regard to God. With regard to men, parrhēsia will be the courage to assert 
the truth one knows and to which one wishes to bear witness regardless of every dan-
ger.5 
Thus, he proposes, “the martyr is the parrhesiast par excellence.”6 
Christianity abandons this positive version of parrhēsia early on, and “this theme of 
parrhēsia-confidence will be replaced by the principle of a trembling obedience, in which 
the Christian will have to fear God and recognize the necessity of submitting to His will, 
and to the will of those who represent Him.”7 As Andreas Folkers puts it of this ascetic 
version, “speaking the truth became an exercise of rather than a challenge to power in 
modernity.“8 This historical moment matters in part because Foucault also claims that 
the ascetic renunciation of parrhēsia is a significant moment in the development of pasto-
ral power, which he had earlier said was itself the precursor of biopower. Thus, “in 
Christianity, the pastorate gave rise to an art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, 
taking in hand, and manipulating men … [which] seems to me to be an important, deci-
sive phenomenon” in the “historical background of … governmentality.” He concludes: 
“the modern state is born, I think, when governmentality becomes a calculated and re-
flective practice.”9 
                                                        
3 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth (the Government of Self and Others 2): Lectures at the Collège De France, 
1983-1984 [1984], ed. Arnold I. Davidson (2011), 336. 
4 Ibid., 182. 
5 Ibid., 331. 
6 Ibid., 332. 
7 Ibid., 333. 
8 Andreas Folkers, "Daring the Truth: Foucault, Parrhesia and the Genealogy of Critique," Theory, Culture & 
Society (2015), 8. 
9 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-78 [1978] (2007), 165. 
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Foucault’s sympathies fairly clearly align with the abandoned, mystical version. As 
he puts it: 
It seems to me that the long and difficult persistence of mysticism, of mystical experi-
ence in Christianity, is nothing other than the survival of the parrhesiastic pole of con-
fidence in God, which, not without difficulty, has subsisted in the margins against the 
great enterprise of anti-parrhesiastic suspicion that man is called upon to manifest and 
practice with regard to himself and others, through obedience to God, and in fear and 
trembling before this same God.10 
Foucault is of course not making an argument for the love of God, what he is doing is 
finding in this subaltern parrhēsia a critical technique, in the precise sense that it practices 
“the art of not being governed quite so much.”11 As a response to ascetic dictates of obe-
dience, ancient Cynical practices thus “left a certain mode of life in the history of the 
West, a certain bios, which, in different modalities, has played a crucial role.”12 On the 
whole, this narrative thus suggests a possible connection between ancient, pre-Christian 
parrhēsia and a critique of biopolitics. It also suggests that parrhēsia is vulnerable to coop-
tion by dominant power structures. 
Of course, even if its history shows its opposition to what will become biopolitics, 
Greek parrhēsia does not directly speak to our problems, and Foucault underscores that 
“you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at 
another time by other people.”13 At the same time, study of Greek parrhēsia might offer a 
clue as to what a renewed critical parrhēsia might look like today, and what the “main 
danger” confronting it would be. Interestingly, Foucault seems to want us to pursue this 
line of inquiry. After noting that late Greek Cynicism is a form of parrhēsia which “finds 
its instrument … in the very life of the person who must thus manifest or speak the truth 
in the form of a manifestation of existence,” he moves immediately to the present: 
Cynicism appears as this way of manifesting the truth, of practicing alethurgy, the 
production of truth in the form of life. It seems to me that I have found a theme here … 
which was really very important in ancient philosophy, in Christian spirituality, much 
less in contemporary philosophy no doubt, but certainly in what could be called politi-
cal ethics since the nineteenth century: this is the theme of the true life.14 
He thus cites the nineteenth-century revolutionary movement as “another support of 
Cynicism understood as a form of life in the scandal of the truth.”15 He also suggests that 
“you see the problem of the style of revolutionary life reappearing fairly constantly in 
what may be called leftism.”16 In a very late interview, he makes analogous remarks 
                                                        
10 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 337. 
11 Michel Foucault, "What Is Critique," [1978] in The Politics of Truth: Michel Foucault, ed. S. Lotringer and L. 
Hochroch (1997), 45. 
12 Courage of Truth, 339. 
13 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," [1982] in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (1984), 342. 
14 Courage of Truth, 217, 18. 
15 Ibid., 183. 
16 Ibid., 185. 
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about the dependence of “recent liberation movements” on “so-called scientific 
knowledge” of the self, and notes he is “struck by the similarity of problems.” 17 
On this reading, a prominent model of resistant politics valorizes subjects who lead a 
“true life.” Such subjects would achieve a degree of freedom in that life; living a true life 
would also be a precondition for resistant political action. As I will show in detail, this 
construction tends to elide the boundary between ethical authenticity and political eth-
ics. The result is a blurring of questions about what a resistant subject is and what one 
does. Such a conflation of political action and subject position, and the risk that the latter 
becomes reified, is one that Foucault views his own work as bringing into question. 
Thus, in “Subject and Power,” Foucault suggests that his work over the previous twenty 
years had not been to analyze power as such, but “to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.”18 In Courage of Truth, 
he introduces his discussion of the Cynics in the context of an ambiguity he finds in So-
cratic parrhēsia between metaphysical discourse about the soul and an ethical “stylistics 
of existence.” He notes of the latter that “this aspect of the history of subjectivity … has 
of course been hidden and overshadowed by what could be called the history of meta-
physics” but that it should “not be neglected.”19 As I will suggest, the risk of the move to 
authenticity is that ethical practices are grounded metaphysically at the expense of their 
political contexts. 
Placing subjectivity in the context of a form of life and not a metaphysics of the soul 
thus requires the rejection of essentializing and reductive views of subjectivity. In “Sub-
ject and Power,” Foucault proposes and rejects one such view, according to which “all 
types of subjection are derived phenomena, that they are merely the consequences of 
other economic and social processes: forces of production, class struggle, and ideological 
structures which determine the form of subjectivity.”20 The argument recalls his earlier 
dismissal of the “totalitarian” explanatory structures of Freudianism and orthodox 
Marxism.21 He suggests that today, we see a “tricky combination in the same political 
structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures.”22 The Cynic, 
for whom “the form of existence [is] an essential condition of truth-telling” such that the 
form of life is “the immediate, striking, and unrestrained presence of the truth” is thus of 
interest as presenting an earlier effort at radical resistance that engages politics indirect-
ly at the level of individual strategies for resistant ethical stylization.23 
 
                                                        
17 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," 343. 
18 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. 
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982), 208. 
19 Courage of Truth, 162. 
20 Foucault, "Subject and Power," 213. 
21 Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76 [1976] (2003), 6. For a reading of the 
parrhesia lectures as a response to Marxism and Sartreanism, see Nancy Luxon, "Ethics and Subjectivity: 
Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of Michel Foucault," Political Theory 36:3 (2008). For evi-
dence that we face similar problems with reification of critical categories today, see, e.g., Jasbir Puar’s dis-
cussion of the reification of intersectionality in "“I Would Rather Be a Cyborg Than a Goddess:’ Becoming-
Intersectional in Assemblage Theory," philoSOPHIA 2:1 (2012). 
22 "Subject and Power," 213. 
23 Courage of Truth, 172-173. 
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2. Simulacra and the Impossibility of Politics 
If Foucault wants us to see a connection between contemporary militancy and ancient 
parrhēsia, what does he have to say about ancient parrhēsia? For the purposes of the anal-
ysis here, and although many commentators elide the distinction, it is important to note 
that Foucault does not treat ancient parrhēsia as a unitary phenomenon. In particular, he 
takes Socratic parrhēsia as liminal between an earlier, political mode and a later, ethical 
one.24 Thus, Socratic parrhēsia is responsive to “the crisis of political parrhēsia, or at least 
the crisis of political institutions as a possible site for parrhēsia.”25 The crisis is provoked 
by a question: “what makes true discourse powerless in a democracy?”26 Foucault had 
earlier established the historical context for the question, noting that in the time between 
Pericles and Plato, one could detect the emergence of “a certain ambiguity concerning 
the value of parrhēsia.”27 The problem was twofold. On the one hand, the democratic 
practice of allowing anyone to speak raises a problem about the subjectivity of the par-
rhesiast insofar as “parrhesia makes it possible for the worst as well as the best to 
speak.”28 On the other hand, the presence of risk in parrhesiastic speech incentivizes 
speakers to say “what the people or the sovereign would like to hear.” This produces a 
problem with flattery, which represents “parrhēsia’s shadow, its bad and dubious imita-
tion.”29 
The full analysis of these late pre-Platonic changes in parrhesia is of course quite com-
plex. For the sake of simplicity, I want to focus on the question of true speech and de-
mocracy in Plato. For the Greeks generally, Foucault suggests that “if democracy can be 
governed, it is because there is true discourse.”30 The practice of allowing anyone to 
speak introduces the problem of insincere flatterers. Previously, the Greeks convinced 
themselves that this risk had been addressed by restrictions on who was allowed to 
speak – “old, ancestral rights of birth and especially of belonging to the soil … [or per-
sonal] qualities like those of Pericles.”31 The importance of these attributes is evident in 
Foucault’s reading of Euripides’ Ion, in which Ion struggles to demonstrate his lineage. 
However, as Lida Maxwell notes, even this is not enough to stabilize the practice: Ion 
also depends on the silencing of women and slaves.32 
                                                        
24 Jakub Franěk, "Philosophical Parrhesia as Aesthetics of Existence," Continental Philosophy Review 39:2 
(2006), emphasizes the move from politics to ethical parrhēsia in Courage of Truth, but uses it to parallel Fou-
cault and Socrates: Foucault’s discussion of the Socratic Apology should be read as Foucault’s own apologia, 
and his self-presentation as an ethical parrhesiast. This is a fascinating possibility, but I also think it is un-
likely. For one, it ignores the remainder of the text, which moves very quickly to Cynicism. As I will argue, 
the latter portions of Courage of Truth do not, I think, support an easy endorsement of ethical parrhēsia. 
25 Courage of Truth, 73. 
26 Ibid., 40. 
27 Foucault, Government of Self and Others, 301. 
28 Ibid., 302. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 184. On the centrality of parrhēsia to democracy, see, e.g., Torben Bech Dyrberg, "Foucault on 
Parrhesia: The Autonomy of Politics and Democracy," Political Theory 44:2 (2016). 
31 Government of Self and Others, 182. 
32 Lida Maxwell, "The Politics and Gender of Truth-Telling in Foucault’s Lectures on Parrhesia," 
Contemporary Political Theory (2018). As Maxwell argues, this is a silencing that Foucault also elides. 
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Absent these constraints, both visible and invisible, Plato thinks that, in Foucault’s 
paraphrase, “in democracy one cannot distinguish between good and bad speakers, be-
tween discourse which speaks the truth and is useful to the city, and discourse which 
utters lies, flatters, and is harmful.”33 Readers of Plato’s Republic will immediately recall 
the presentation of democracy as a final corruption on the way to tyranny: 
Democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor win, killing some of the rulers 
and casting out some, and share the regime and the ruling offices with those who are 
left on an equal basis; and, for the most part, the offices in it are given by lot …. It is 
probably the fairest of the regimes … just like a many-colored cloak decorated in all 
hues, this regime, decorated with all dispositions, would also look fairest, and many 
perhaps … like boys and women looking at many-colored things, would judge this to 
be the fairest regime (557a-c). 
In such a context, everyone has the ability to say “what is in accord with their private 
will and with what will enable them to satisfy their interests and passions.”34 As Debra 
Nails emphasizes, it is important to read Plato’s critique in its historical context.35 Athe-
nian democracy was beset by a number of structural problems to which Plato clearly 
alludes; three points are most relevant here. First, citizens developed no particular skills 
in governing because offices were chosen by lot, and people rotated in and out of gov-
ernmental tasks randomly. Second, the lawmaking Assembly was at best fickle, and was 
famous for reversing itself repeatedly. Finally, Plato in the Statesman (302d1-303b5) dis-
tinguishes law-governed democracies from those whose laws do not exist or have been 
forgotten. That is, Plato is interested in and open to ways that democracy could address 
the problem. 
Foucault is of course not interested in whether Plato is “correct” about democracy in 
general or in its Athenian version; he is interested instead in what this says about Plato’s 
view of parrhēsia. From a Platonic point of view, parrhēsia is a necessary part of any 
properly functioning polis, but “cannot be told in a political field defined by an absence 
of ethical differentiation between the subjects speaking.”36 Foucault calls this the “Pla-
tonic reversal” and suggests that “after the criticism of democracy’s inability to make 
room for truth-telling, the Platonic reversal consists in the validation of truth-telling as 
the defining principle of a politeia (of a political structure, a constitution, a type of re-
gime) from which, precisely, democracy is carefully excluded.”37 That is, on this reading 
of Plato, the necessity of parrhēsia to a functioning polity when combined with the inabil-
ity of parrhēsia to function in democracy as it was practiced in Athens shows that Athe-
nian democracy is not a viable regime type.  
That the problem is presented as one bad of imitations and indistinction, the absence 
of a way to distinguish good claims to parrhēsia from bad ones, suggests that it is one of 
simulacra. As Deleuze proposes, in language clearly echoed in Foucault’s discussion, the 
                                                        
33 Courage of Truth, 40. 
34 Ibid., 36. 
35 Debra Nails, "Plato's 'Republic' in Its Athenian Context," History of Political Thought 33:1 (2012). The fol-
lowing description of Athenian democracy derives from Nails.  
36 Courage of Truth, 44. 
37 Ibid., 45. 
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Platonic forms first and above all serve a “police” function, which is “not to oppose the 
world of images in its entirety but to select the good images, the icons which resemble 
from within, and eliminate the bad images or simulacra.”38 This authenticating function 
is prior to the classifying one, and as he notes, “the one problem which recurs through-
out Plato’s philosophy is the problem of measuring rivals and selecting claimants.”39 
Plato stages the difficulty in Socrates, who is tasked here with awakening not kings, but 
citizens to the need for veridical speech. In other words, the difficulty in sustaining po-
litical parrhēsia leads, in essence, to a retreat from politics into ethics, a move that is par-
tially accomplished by Socrates. As Foucault puts it, parrhēsia in Plato “has to address 
individuals at least as much as it does the whole body of citizens” in order to show them 
that “they must govern themselves in order to govern the city properly.”40  
Foucault reads Cynicism as a radicalization of the Socratic move. Against the philo-
sophical development of the components of a “true life,” the Cynics charge, in essence, 
that the philosophers merely speak of such a true life, but do not live it. If pre-Socratic 
parrhēsia represents the bravery of speaking truth to the Assembly, and Socratic parrhēsia 
“consists in telling people, and getting them gradually to recognize, that they do not 
really know what they say and think they know,” the Cynics will present parrhēsia as the 
scandal induced by treating truth as itself a “form of life.”41 For example, philosophy 
treated the principle of living a pure, unalloyed life as requiring indifference to material 
goods; in practice, this often meant voluntarily giving them up for a time in order to be 
prepared for misfortune should it strike.42 For the Cynic, the indifference to material 
goods is practiced as “an elaboration of oneself in the form of visible poverty. It is not an 
acceptance of poverty; it is a real conduct of poverty.”43  
At the core of the Cynic challenge is the idea that the true life, the life of one whose 
parrhēsia is legitimate, has nothing to hide. The Socratic parrhesiast asserts this idea as a 
principle, but of course such speech could be concealing a hypocrisy in how the philos-
opher actually lives. Accordingly, the Cynic responds “by a dramatization of this prin-
ciple of non-concealment in and by life itself.”44 In short: 
Cynic courage of truth consists in getting people to condemn, reject, despise, and in-
sult the very manifestation of what they accept, or claim to accept at the level of prin-
ciples. It involves facing up to their anger when presenting them with the image of 
what they accept and value in thought, and at the same time reject and despise in their 
life. This is the Cynic scandal. After political bravery and Socratic irony we have, if 
you like, Cynic scandal.45 
That is, the move is to present one’s entire life for inspection in an effort to authenticate 
oneself; the object is to demonstrate a “simplicity which is truth of existence [and] ... no 
                                                        
38 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition [1968] (1994), 127. 
39 Ibid., 59-60. 
40 Government of Self and Others, 303. 
41 Courage of Truth, 233-4. 
42 Ibid., 257. 
43 Ibid., 258. 
44 Ibid., 253. 
45 Ibid., 234. 
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possibility of deceptions being produced by the disconnection, the discrepancy between 
what happens and discourse, phantoms, and signs.”46 
Foucault emphasizes that this “absolute visibility of the Cynic life” stands at the cen-
ter of the entire Cynic practice; the true life of the Cynic is marked by its complete trans-
parency, and in this we see its solution to the problem of political simulacra: we know 
the Cynic cannot be a flatterer because he has nothing to hide.47 The Cynic has no inter-
ests beyond his animal functions and visibility. Hence, not only will “Cynic public life … 
be a life of blatant and entirely visible naturalness,” the Cynic is also to reject the private 
life of the household, and “the Cynics … reject marriage and the family, and they prac-
tice, or claim to practice, free union.”48 Together, these are flip sides of the same coin; in 
contemporary terms, we might say that the Cynic authenticates himself – and implicitly 
criticizes others for not authenticating themselves in this way – not just by denying any 
need for privacy, but also by living entirely in public view. 
3. Absolute visibility today 
As indicated above, Foucault suggests that the theme of a true life is manifest today, 
particularly in oppositional politics. The question is whether it has political traction. In 
other words, does living fully in view allow one to address the problem of simulacra? In 
what follows, I will argue that it does not. Tracing the Greek formulation of difficulties 
in parrhēsia and efforts to resolve them instead underscores a difficulty that Foucault 
sees in our own political situation. Initially, one should note that Foucault forcefully ar-
gues that power functions today through enforced visibility. His critique of panopticism 
as a technique for ensuring the total visibility of subjects (but not of power) is well-
known. Visibility generates compliance: “it is the fact of being constantly seen, of being 
able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection.”49 
Surveillance since Foucault has increased in both extension and intensity, to the point 
that current surveillance theorists prefer terms like “surveillant assemblage” or “infor-
mation imperative.”50 
Indeed, permanent visibility has become so normalized that it is no longer scandal-
ous. At least, it no longer reliably creates the Cynic scandal. Indeed, subjects now often 
treat it as desirable, rather than punitive. The rise of reality TV presents one example, 
and the ways that Facebook and other social networking sites reward users who share 
more and more in carefully curated “games of truth” is another. Similarly, consumers 
are trained to give away their privacy for “free” services on the Internet. When consum-
ers are not forthcoming, sites like Facebook routinely use deceptive policy changes and 
default settings to trick them into doing so anyway. Collectively, techniques such as the-
                                                        
46 Ibid., 222. 
47 Ibid., 254. 
48 Ibid., 255, 63. 
49 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison [1975] (1977), 187. 
50 For surveillant assemblage, see Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, "The Surveillant Assemblage," 
The British Journal of Sociology 51:4 (2000). For “information imperative,” see Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the 
Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice (2012). For reasons of space, I will not be discuss-
ing surveillance by government entities, though the Snowden revelations certainly indicate that the state 
has also adopted the view that it would be a good idea for all citizens to be fully on display, all the time.  
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se constitute a consistent apparatus to produce compliant, market-oriented subjects who 
freely make themselves available for continuous inspection, and who are either resigned 
to it or find doing so rewarding.51 The phenomenon dates to long before social network-
ing; for example, when performance artist Jennifer Ringley set up webcams all over her 
apartment and left them continuously on, the move was promptly celebrated as em-
powered cyborg subjectivity, and not as another example of willingly submitting to a 
disempowering patriarchal gaze.52 Jennicam thus functioned as an almost perfect exam-
ple of cynical ethics, presenting the “scandalous banality” of Ringley’s life for general 
inspection.53 Importantly, Jennicam also presented an antinomy: because of the ambiva-
lent politics of visibility, one could equally prove that the site was subversive or not 
subversive, with no way to know which. 
Not only is visibility rewarded, privacy is penalized. Privacy looks bad; why demand 
privacy unless you are doing something you shouldn’t? Corporate executives routinely 
proclaim that privacy is dead, outdated and counterproductive. For example, Sun Mi-
crosystems CEO Scott McNealy declared in 1999 that “you have zero privacy anyway. 
Get over it.” Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has repeatedly talked about his compa-
ny’s efforts to shape social norms in favor of more disclosure.54 Conceptual ballasting for 
these claims comes from theorists such as Judge Richard Posner, who argues that inter-
est in the privacy of information is an interest in enforcing an information asymmetry in 
markets.55 If I apply for a job and hide a criminal record, for example, I am trying to get 
you to overvalue me as a potential employee by keeping you ignorant of my past. Ac-
cordingly, Posner proposes that the law should not protect such refusals to disclose, and 
                                                        
51 For reality TV, see Peter Weibel, "Pleasure and the Panoptic Principle," in Ctrl [Space]: Rhetorics of 
Surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother, ed. Thomas Y. Levin, Ursula Frohne, and Peter Weibel (2002). For 
“games of truth,” see Rob Horning, "Games of Truth," The New Inquiry (November 3, 2013). For resignation, 
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Resigned: Challenging Narratives of Rational Choice in Digital Privacy Debates," Policy & Internet 9:2 
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think they are, presumably due to the settings’ complexity. See Yabing Liu et al., "Analyzing Facebook 
Privacy Settings: User Expectations Vs. Reality," in Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on 
Internet measurement conference (Berlin, Germany: ACM, 2011), and Michelle Madejski, Maritza Johnson, 
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Law Review Blog (April 4, 2018). For subjectification as important to privacy, see Julie E. Cohen, "What 
Privacy Is For," Harvard Law Review 126 (2013); my own development of the argument is in Gordon Hull, 
"Successful Failure: What Foucault Can Teach Us About Privacy Self-Management in a World of Facebook 
and Big Data," Ethics and Information Technology 17:2 (2015).  
52 Krissi M. Jimroglou, "A Camera with a View: Jennicam, Visual Representation, and Cyborg Subjectivity," 
Information, Communication & Society 2:4 (1999); see also the more critical discussion in Jane Bailey, "Life in 
the Fishbowl: Feminist Interrogations of Webcamming," in Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy 
and Identity in a Networked Society, ed. Ian Kerr, Carole Lucock, and Valerie Steeves (2009). 
53 For “scandalous banality,” see Courage of Truth, 232. 
54 For McNealy, see Polly Sprenger, "Sun on Privacy: 'Get over It,'" Wired (Jan. 26, 1999). For Zuckerberg, see 
Kevin Drum, "Mark Zuckerberg Does Not Like Personal Privacy," Mother Jones (April 10, 2018). 
55 Richard Posner, "The Right of Privacy," Georgia Law Review 12 (1978). 
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in some cases ought to compel disclosure.56 In the meantime, the move to data collection 
more generally makes it unpalatable to withhold information. Apart from access to web-
sites and the potential loss of social capital that foregoing sites such as Facebook re-
quires, social media is increasingly important in employment. Not only do employers 
scrutinize social media accounts of prospective employees, they sometimes treat the lack 
of social media content as itself a problem.57 Similarly, access to social services is often 
conditional upon data collection, which is then used as a way to condition services on 
compliance with behavioral desiderata. The failure to use data-collecting devices can 
also subject someone to socioeconomic disadvantage by shutting her out of market 
goods which are only accessible by submitting to surveillance.58 
The rise of informatics - “big data” - makes the problem worse, in part because con-
temporary capital has made a market out of information itself. Data is big business, pri-
marily because it enables the visibility required for targeted marketing. Once infor-
mation is commodified, data collection essentially functions as a form of original accu-
mulation where individuals are deprived of their privacy for very little in return; this 
information is then sold to advertisers or data brokers. Individuals become not only con-
sumers, but also resources.59 Bernard Harcourt concludes: 
This new and emerging political economy of data has been made possible … [partly] 
by a new form of power that has taught us to willingly give our information when 
asked, to identify ourselves, to reveal our deepest secrets, to comply with requests – 
and ironically, in a world of private property, to never feel entitled to express private 
property ownership over our own identity and all this personal information.60 
Big data not only magnifies the extent to which subjects can be surveilled, but also in-
troduces new correlations and risks, new possibilities for discrimination and error. Data 
even makes it possible to make inferences about those who have attempted to opt-out of 
surveillance; Facebook collects vast amounts of data not just on users and their friends, 
but on non-users as well.61 
As with earlier surveillance, data functions both as a strategy of control and as an 
economy of pleasurable ethical stylization. An example of the former is compulsory em-
                                                        
56 A more complete discussion would note the extent to which demands for disclosure function differential-
ly: more transparency is demanded of the poor, women and racial minorities. See, e.g., Loïc Wacquant, 
Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (2009), and Dorothy E. Roberts, "Prison, 
Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers," UCLA Law Review 59 (2012). For the ways 
(often involuntary) online identification is used to attack women, see Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in 
Cyberspace (2014). As Maxwell notes, following the lead of a rich body of feminist literature, privacy has 
always been a difficult topic for the disempowered. See Maxwell, “Politics and Gender of Truth-Telling,” 
57 Allison Cheston, "Recruiters Say: Avoid Linkedin at Your Peril," Forbes (May 11, 2012). 
58 For social services, see, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, 
and Punish the Poor (2017). For socioeconomic disadvantage, see Jonas Lerman, "Big Data and Its 
Exclusions," Stanford Law Review Online 66 (2013). 
59 Julie E. Cohen, "The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy," 
Philosophy & Technology 31:2 (2017). 
60 "Governing, Exchanging, Securing: Big Data and the Production of Digital Knowledge," in Big data, 
entreprises et sciences sociales - Usages et partages des données numériques de masse (Paris, 2014), 30. 
61 For data collection from non-users, see Daniel Kahn Gillmor, "Facebook Is Tracking Me Even Though I’m 
Not on Facebook," in Free Future (April 5, 2018).  
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ployee wellness programs in the U.S., which condition access to healthcare on the will-
ingness of employees to submit not just to wellness regimes, but also often to verifica-
tion regimes using strategies like wearable technologies.62 Employees are involuntary 
placed in the position of the Cynic: not only must they attest to their compliance with 
appropriate norms, they must make their life itself available for inspection to validate 
their testimony. An example of the latter is the “quantified self” movement, which cele-
brates the ability of wearables to make highly granular aspects of daily life available for 
inspection as an emancipatory means of care for oneself and others. In other words, as 
Foucault had noted, liberation movements derive some of their authority from a “so-
called scientific knowledge” of the self. Quantified-self technologies do not just encom-
pass fitness; they have extended even into intimate relationships and orgasm-tracking.63 
Just as in the case of JenniCam and Reality TV, voluntary submission to highly intrusive 
surveillance is coming to be seen positively. In a generalized regime of Cynical self-
exposure, the very generalization of efforts to implement the truth “in life itself” de-
prives it of its scandalous character. 
The preceding is not meant to be an exhaustive survey; it is meant to indicate that 
contemporary society overproduces visibility as a condition for participation. This has 
the dual effect of banalizing visibility and making it more difficult as a criterion for au-
thenticating parrhesiastic speech.64 It is against this background that we should evaluate 
the possibility of importing parrhēsia into a contemporary context. 
4. The Failure of Credentialing: Return of the Simulacra 
To understand the potential role of parrhēsia today, consider first the status of scientific 
discourse. Foucault suggests that the problem of the true life, articulated by the Cynics, 
has retreated because of the ability of religion and science to function as guarantors of 
truth. In other words, the strictures and orthodoxies of science serve the credentialing 
function that status-based restrictions served in pre-Socratic Athens. Foucault suggests 
that: 
If scientific practice, scientific institutions, and integration within the scientific consen-
sus are by themselves sufficient to assure access to the truth, then it is clear that the 
problem of the true life as the necessary basis for the practice of truth-telling disap-
pears.65 
Although much more would need to be said to fully establish the argument, allow me to 
suggest that the current epistemic status of science is paradoxically bifurcating in a way 
that suggests the problem of the true life should, as it has, prominently reappear. 
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Selves: Self-Tracking Modes and Dataveillance," Economy and Society 45:1 (2016). 
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65 Courage of Truth, 235. 
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On the one hand, the prevalence of manufactured disputes over the reliability of cli-
mate science or the safety of vaccinations suggests that science is increasingly viewed as 
itself an ideological construct.66 There is also substantive evidence of the corruption of 
the epistemic process of science. For example, Pharmaceutical companies and the Con-
tract Research Organizations (CROs) to which they outsource clinical trials often sepa-
rate drug marketing from drug efficacy.67 As Phillip Mirowski details, the agreement 
with the CROs is essentially that only positive results will be reported, with potentially 
negative trials either rapidly discontinued or suppressed. As a result, negative or ad-
verse clinical results are never reported. Worse, CROs routinely pay doctors to put their 
names on the studies to apply a veneer of credibility. This ghost-writing problem is so 
bad that Australian litigation discovered that every issue of at least six entire journals 
published by Elsevier was ghostwritten. Thus, research into even the medical literature 
around a drug produces information the epistemic status of which cannot be judged. 
One of the early advocates of evidence-based medicine has declared the process “hi-
jacked;” as Mirowksi concludes, “the line between science and advertising is consciously 
being blurred in pharmaceutical research.”68 This is emphatically not to claim that sci-
ence was ever independent of its social context. It is however to note the perception that 
the boundaries between science and marketing are blurring undermines science’s status 
as a guarantor of truth. 
On the other hand, as argued in the previous section, even as the epistemic function 
of science is brought into question, the scientific and technological enterprise is being 
deployed politically as a means to ensure the continuous visibility of subjects. Although 
Foucault documents the extent to which governmental entities have engaged in such 
disciplinary regimes, the important point here, as surveillance theorists have noted, is 
the generalization into other spheres and the adoption of highly intrusive surveillance 
techniques in markets. These work to produce docile or even enthusiastic subjects who 
take permanent visibility as normal. The background context is thus one where the epis-
temic authority of scientific discourse is in decline, and where the visibility of everyone 
is taken as a given. 
Social media then produces an information environment in which simulacra become 
much harder to detect. On the one hand, blurring such as that between science and mar-
keting is representative of a broader deracination of claims of knowledge. There is radi-
cally less context by which to judge their veracity, or to assess them historically or con-
textually. Instead, claims of parrhēsia can serve as brand identity, a problem Foucault 
explicitly accuses the PCF of fomenting.69 More subtly, harvested data can also be used 
                                                        
66 This is not a new claim, as Marxist accounts (which as Foucault notes repeatedly had their own problem 
with authentication) argued that bourgeois science was ideological. Of course, many blame Foucauldian 
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to infer what kinds of message someone would find persuasive and when; everyone 
thus receives a somewhat different version of the truth.70 For example, a leaked Face-
book document showed that the company’s Australian division could help advertisers 
to know “moments when young people need a confidence boost” and respond accord-
ingly.71 More generally, Facebook has published research indicating that the “emotional 
contagion” effect – the tendency to pick up on the moods of others – works online.72 This 
means that the company can, and almost certainly does, curate the emotional content of 
users’ newsfeeds to keep them on the site longer. It is perhaps worth mentioning that 
Facebook users can be manipulated into increased voting; in one experiment, users who 
got a personalized reminder to vote were slightly more likely to do so than those who 
did not.73 Such nudging could easily change the outcome of a close election, and could 
be targeted at users whose data indicated they were likely to vote a certain way. Put dif-
ferently, this sort of invisible curation makes it very difficult to distinguish parrhēsia and 
flattery. 
Moreover, if ethical parrhēsia requires that a subject speaking declare or demonstrate 
her commitment to norms of the “true life,” such a commitment can easily be faked, un-
dermining the Platonic requirement that there be no problem with “discourse, phantoms 
and signs” as concealment.74 Accounts of Russian manipulation of online media prior to 
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election suggest the extent of the problem. For example, ap-
proximately two-thirds of Americans get at least some of their news from social media, 
and nearly half of the American electorate received deliberately planted fake stories on 
                                                                                                                                                                           
“coolness,” erasing both the long history of White Supremacy in the U.S. and the initial, critical use of cool-
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social media in the run-up to the election.75 Thus, one “Melvin Redick of Harrisburg, Pa., 
a friendly-looking American with a backward baseball cap and a young daughter, post-
ed on Facebook a link to a brand-new website,” saying on June 8, 2016 that “These guys 
show hidden truth about Hillary Clinton, George Soros and other leaders of the US. Vis-
it #DCLeaks website. It’s really interesting!” Of course, both Melvin Redick and the site 
he pointed to were complete fabrications.76 As Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger 
comment: 
The software posed as real people – regular folks offering earnest, special-interest-free, 
political opinions – and masked their real agenda of being tools designed to sway 
votes and circulate calculated talking points. Even though disinformation campaigns 
have been going on for a long time and attack ads have become a political staple, the 
bot situation is especially troubling. In a polarized world, when bots are designed to 
look and sound like us, our neighbors, and our friends, it can be hard to know who – 
or better yet, what – is engineered to follow a deviously programmed script.77 
In short, the software was designed to trick readers into believing that it was presenting 
truth by presenting itself as the voice of honest, trustworthy speakers. This undermines 
precisely the authentication strategy of Socratic parrhēsia.  
It is also important to note that a substantial portion of the news was apparently de-
signed to increase social divisions, independently of whether it benefited a specific can-
didate. For example, the Russian-backed Internet Research Agency tried to stoke activ-
ism both for and against Black Lives Matter. Far-right media portrayed the student sur-
vivors of the Parkland high school shooting as “false flags” and “crisis actors” in an ef-
fort to undermine their legitimacy as speakers. Outside of the U.S., fake news on social 
media has led to outbreaks of Buddhist-Muslim mob violence in Sri Lanka, inflamed 
attacks against the Rohingya in Myanmar and led to lynchings in Indonesia, India and 
Mexico.78 In other words, parrhesiastic speech can easily be faked and manipulated to 
create modern versions of the sorts of problems that Plato found in Athens. 
In the present context, it is difficult to see how the Cynic move toward living the true 
life can help. The Cynic was able to be physically present for inspection, something 
which is lacking in an environment where access to speakers is primarily electronically 
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mediated. The problem is not that everyone curates their image on social media; after 
all, reports that Diogenes responded to being treated like a dog at a dinner party by uri-
nating on the guests underscore that public personae have always been curated.79 The 
Cynics were aware of the perception of curation as a problem; as Foucault notes, “the 
criticism of Cynicism is always made in the name of an essential Cynicism.”80 The prob-
lem is one they attempted to solve by pushing curation to the point that it turned into 
authenticity. This is not only why they attempted to eschew any private space for them-
selves; it is why they also adopted and radicalized the other philosophical techniques for 
self-authentication by actively seeking poverty, attempting to live in accord with their 
animal needs alone, and asserting that they were kings (in order to expose “how hollow, 
illusory, and precarious the monarchy of kings is”).81 These techniques were always 
fragile; now that their performance can easily be fabricated, they seem completely inad-
equate to their assigned task of sorting through simulacra. 
The background problem is partly that the strategy is premised on the idea that the 
visibility sought by the Cynic is both confined to the Cynic and scandalous. As we move 
to a regime where universal visibility is both increasingly universal and an object of cu-
riosity and play, neither of these conditions hold. Further, the problem of curation is 
intensified by the increasing levels of mediation that lie between a subject and her self-
representation. These layers of mediation can be manipulated by speakers to authenti-
cate themselves, but they can also be manipulated to undermine one’s opponents. As 
Foucault quips after the “essential Cynicism” line, his audience has “seen the same phe-
nomenon in recent years with the criticism of socialism, which could only be made in 
the name of socialism, an essential socialism.”82 By analogy, the solution to problems 
posed by visibility is presented as more visibility. 
5. Conclusion: Authenticity and Subjectification 
The preceding has outlined the depth of the difficulties parrhēsia faces in the current en-
vironment. I would like to close by suggesting that the uncritical endorsement of 
parrhēsia in the current context tends also to uncritically adopt a dubious model of sub-
jectivity. As I suggested in the introduction, this is a problem against which Foucault 
warned and that his work starts to assemble the tools to understand. His late work, in 
particular, is explicitly oriented to understanding the processes by which people become 
certain kinds of subjects, to the point that he suggests in “Subject and Power” that ques-
tions about subject-formation were what drove his research into kinds of power. Fou-
cault’s research into subjectification is particularly salient in studying how parrhēsia 
might function or be reclaimed today. 
The deeper Foucauldian problem with the trajectory taken in later Greek parrhesiastic 
practices is that processes of subject-formation undermine the entire project of authenti-
cation, because it is not clear what would constitute a “true” life or even if such a thing 
could exist. As the decline of privacy evidenced in social media has made newly appar-
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ent, speaking subjects are substantially a product of their environments. Again, evidence 
from Facebook allows one to make the theoretical point concretely. The issue here is not 
micro-targeting, which might be conceptualized as very precise efforts to influence what 
existing subjects do. The issue is rather of trying to manipulate who subjects will be. 
Such manipulation would, among other things, be almost completely undetectable. Pub-
lished research indicates both that personality traits can be predicted from an automated 
analysis of Facebook “likes” and that advertising targeted to personality can be much 
more effective than non-targeted, even if only one “like” is available for the prediction.83 
The implication is that Facebook’s data can be used to predict what sorts of things users 
might do, and to nudge them one way or another. Documents leaked in spring 2018 
suggest that this is precisely what the company is doing: using various machine-learning 
techniques to anticipate what users will do, thereby enabling advertisers or other agents 
to steer them before they act.84 In a direct sense, the subjectivity of Facebook users will 
be in part determined by the ways that advertisers, political bots or other agents antici-
pate and influence their behavior. 
This happens in at least three ways. First, the networking environment structures in-
dividuals’ information environments. That environment determines what kinds of ac-
tions are possible, and what kinds of information are “true.” If someone depends on 
Facebook for their news, then the “truth” of world events is whatever Facebook’s news-
feed turns up. To be sure, this was a problem with mass media as well, but the deracin-
ated bits of information that emerge in algorithmically-curated newsfeeds are there for 
reasons which are entirely opaque. The veracity or even identity of the speaker is nearly 
impossible to verify, and, unlike major newspapers, those senders often have no incen-
tives to be who they say they are. Second, this structuring is both invisible and dynamic, 
in the sense that it is always modulated to respond to new information obtained about 
individuals. Both the dynamic modulation and the invisibility make such “hypernudg-
es” particularly good techniques of subjectification insofar as the behaviors they incen-
tivize are easy to habituate. Finally, insofar as the data that generates them draws from 
analyzable patterns, the nudges also tend to cite social norms in the process of getting 
subjects to iterate them.85 They thus tend to push individuals toward conformity. Tobias 
Matzner puts the point as follows: 
Data does not only produce suspects, but also potential partners, employees and 
customers. Claims to truthfulness are part of this game—not its precondition as the 
representationalist account would have it. Data can produce impostures and 
transparency, show-offs and “open books,” facts and lies. Here, not only the data itself 
is important. The very fact whether or not we appear in a particular way in digital 
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communication—on a social networking site, in a texting service— contributes to who 
we are.86 
It is this problem against which the authenticating practices of ethical and Cynical 
parrhēsia have such difficulty. 
Foucault’s study of the Cynics shows that ethical stylization can be critical; nobody 
would argue that the Cynics upheld social norms, even as he shows that the absolute 
visibility demanded by cynical practice comes at a very high cost. So too, outside the far 
right, the Parkland students were taken to be authentic and thus presenting legitimate 
demands, largely because they were seen as traumatized children who were difficult to 
interpellate as “political” actors. The account of parrhēsia thus offers a partial answer to 
those who complain that Foucault’s work on ethics offers nothing in the way of re-
sistance. At the same time, reading the parrhēsia lectures in the context of current pat-
terns of social media use and of a general social focus on visibility suggests that it is im-
portant to keep in mind Foucault’s larger concerns with subjectification as well. Visibil-
ity now is no longer just a critique of power; it is also an exercise of it. The pervasiveness 
of visibility diminishes its ability to scandalize and thereby dispossesses the Cynical 
strategy of much of its critical bite. In other words, that there were efforts to portray 
even the Parkland survivors as cynical flatterers and “crisis actors” suggests the limits to 
authenticity as a strategy for legitimating parrhesiastic speakers. 
Those concerns imply that the strategy of Cynical parrhēsia depends on a misplaced 
notion of the subject as someone whose life could be purified according to an abstract 
standard, outside of its socio-political context.87 In other words, the idea that stylization 
could produce speech from a space outside of politics presupposes that such a space is 
available, and that techniques of stylization can be somehow apolitical in nature. In that 
regard, the strategy risks reverting to a “metaphysics of the soul,” instead of the “aes-
thetics of existence” that Greek parrhesiasts tried to practice and that Foucault’s lectures 
try to uncover.88 In such a reversion, Cynicism would risk becoming “mere logos” with-
out actually doing anything in the world.89 
The historical moment of Greek Cynicism was one where truth-telling and mode of 
life could converge with minimal theoretical mediation: 
This connecting up of truth-telling and mode of life, this fundamental, essential con-
nection in Cynicism between living in a certain way and dedicating oneself to telling 
the truth is all the more noteworthy for taking place immediately as it were, without 
doctrinal mediation, or at any rate within a fairly rudimentary theoretical framework.90 
To the extent that this convergence can now only be maintained with extensive media-
tion, or where simulacra interfere with its efficacy, parrhēsia requires a different founda-
                                                        
86 Matzner, “Beyond Data as Representation,” 205. 
87 I thus think that analyses that emphasize the abstract idea of self-transformation are mistaken. For a re-
cent example, see Giovanni Maria Mascaretti, "Michel Foucault on Problematization, Parrhesia and 
Critique," materiali foucaultiani 3:5-6 (2014). 
88 For the opposition, see Courage of Truth, 159-162. 
89 For “mere logos,” see Government of Self and Others, 254. 
90 Courage of Truth, 165. 
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tion. The Cynics were right to locate critique in practice, in (as Foucault describes the 
Greek priority) ergon and not logos.91 However, insofar as their practices depended on a 
specific social structure of truth, they cannot be uncritically assimilated into a context 
where that alethurgy is radically in question. As Foucault strongly implies, we should be 
wary of such efforts at assimilation, as they risk enacting a problematic view of ethical 
subjectivity as something somehow separable from its political context. These contexts 
are specific; rather than looking for a unified theoretical account of parrhēsia, one is bet-
ter off looking at “tools that can be used at the local level only when the theoretical unity 
of their discourse is thoroughly disrupted.”92 
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